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I. INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan stated that the complex activities of some large banks
"may cause capital ratios as calculated under the existing rules to
become increasingly misleading."1  The need for an accurate
assessment of the safety of our financial institutions is driving one
of the most comprehensive, well coordinated regulatory efforts in
banking history As part of this effort, the Basel Committee, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), have
issued proposed revisions to capital adequacy guidelines to protect
the safety and health of the banking system. The impetus for this
extraordinary joint effort to modernize financial legislation is a
combination of the globalization of financial institutions and their
increased participation in complex financial transactions, most
1. Ed Blount, How Safe is your Bank?, A.B.A. BANKING J., Sept. 2000, at 88.
2. Id.
3. Id. "The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a committee of banking
supervisory authorities which was established by the central bank Governors of the
Group of Ten Countries in 1975. It consists of senior representatives of bank
supervisory authorities and central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. It usually meets at the Bank for International
Settlements in Basel, where the permanent Secretariat is located." THE BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, A NEW CAPITAL ADEQUACY FRAMEwORK, 4
n.1 (Consultative Paper, June 1999). All Basel Committee papers referred to in this
document can be obtained from the BIS website at http://www.bis.org/
publ/index.htm (last modified Feb. 12,2001) [hereinafter Basel 1999 Proposal].
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notably securitizations.
While the Basel Committee works on a comprehensive
regulatory framework for capital adequacy levels, United States
regulators are pursuing several additional regulatory initiatives.'
In two separate proposals, the agencies are targeting the treatment
of recourse, direct credit substitutes, and retained interests created
during securitization transactions.6 Specifically, the agencies are
looking at the amount of regulatory capital banks should hold to
account for the potential risks of these activities.!
The ability to sustain our financial institutions during crises,
whether specifically related to one individual institution or a
systemic crisis, largely depends on the institutions' ability to
absorb unanticipated losses.8 Many believe when problems occur,
adequate capital levels make the difference between a solvent and
4. Blount, supra note 1. "Securitization has also been defined as: the sale of
equity or debt instruments, representing ownership interests in .... income-producing
asset or pool of assets... structured to reduce or reallocate certain risks inherent in
owning or lending against the underlying assets." TAMAR FRANKEL,
SECURrIZATION: STRUCruRED FINANCING. FINANCIAL ASSETS POOL, AND ASSET-
BACKED SECURITIES (Supp. 1995), at 5.
5. Interagency Guidance on Asset Securitization Activities, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of Thrift Supervision, Dec. 13,
1999, at 2 [hereinafter Interagency Guidance 1999].
6. Proposed Rule for Capital; Leverage and Risk-Based Capital Guidelines;
Capital Maintenance: Residual Interests in Asset Securitizations or Other Transfers
of Financial Assets; Proposed Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 57,993 (proposed Sept. 27, 2000)
[hereinafter September 2000 Proposal]. Recourse is defined by the agencies as "an
arrangement in which a banking organization retains risk of credit loss in connection
with an asset transfer, securitization, if the risk of credit loss exceeds a pro-rata share
of the banking organization's claim on the assets." Risk-Based Capital Standards;
Recourse and Direct Credit Substitutes; 65 Fed. Reg. 12,319, 12,334 (proposed Mar.
8, 2000) [hereinafter March 2000 Proposal]. Direct credit substitutes are defined as:
the term "any arrangement in which a banking organization assumes risk of credit-
related losses from assets or other claims it has not transferred, if the risk of credit
loss exceeds the banking organization's pro-rata share of the assets or other claims."
Id. Currently, under the banking agencies' guidelines, this term covers guarantee-
type arrangements. Id. As revised, it would also include explicitly items such as
purchased subordinated interest, agreements to cover credit losses that arise from
purchased loan servicing rights, credit derivatives, and lines of credit that provide
credit enhancement. Id. Residual interests are assets that are either un-rated or non-
investment grade that are retained by the issuing instrument to provide "first-loss"
credit support for senior positions in the securitization. September 2000 Proposal,
supra, at 57,997. The banks' interest then is subordinated to all the other investors
and they absorb the first credit losses of the transaction. Id.
7. September 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 57,997.
8. Id.
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insolvent bank.9 Regulators hope to mitigate bank failures by
creating and applying new regulatory capital standards to new
activities whose risk might not be fully accounted for by the
current capital adequacy standards.'
This Note addresses the effect of securitization activities,
bank capital levels, and the regulatory response to those activities.
In Part II, this Note discusses how banks securitize assets, the
types of assets that are being securitized, and the increased
reliance by the banking industry on securitizations It explores, in
Part III, the concerns of regulatory agencies regarding
securitization activities of financial institutions, recent bank
failures, and the impact of increased securitization on regulatory
capital levels." In Part IV, the Note examines the regulatory
responses of the OCC, FDIC, FRB, and the OTSY Part V
analyzes the reactions of the banking community to these
provisions while evaluating their effectiveness, as well as their
potential consequences. 4
9. Id. Currently, minimum regulatory capital levels for most banks is 8%. Id.
Alternatively, there are those who do not believe that the capital ratio, or "solvency
ratio" will protect financial institutions from financial ruin. GIORGIO SZEGO, A
Critique of the Basil Regulations, or How to Enhance (IM) Moral Hazards, RISK
MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION IN BANKING, 147, 147-158 (Dan Galai, David
Ruthenberg, Marshall Sarnat & Ben Z. Schreiber eds., 1999). Factors to support the
premise include: the Swedish banks on the eve of bankruptcy in 1992 had average
ratios of 9.3%; The Bank of Naples in 1993, just before its troubles had a ratio of
9.98%. Id. The lesson may well be that adequate capital ratios alone will not prevent
a banking crisis. Id.
10. Blount, supra note 1 at 88. Risk management and control are hot topics for
U.S. bank regulators. JOHN G. HEIMANN, Recent US Experience in Regulating
Financial Risk, in RISK MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION IN BANKING, 169, 169-170
(Dan Galai, David Ruthenberg, Marshall Sarnat & Ben Z. Schreiber eds., 1999).
Banks today face a list of risks: credit risk, market risk, operational risk, technological
risk, reputational risk, people risk, legal risk, suitability risk, liquidity risk, and
settlement risk. Id. at 170.
11. See infra notes 15 - 36 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 37 - 97 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 98 - 139 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 140 - 198 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
Banks borrow money from their depositors and lend that
money to others in the community."' Banks pay little or low
interest on "core deposit accounts.' ' 16 Many banks are now finding
this once reliable source of funds in decline as many American
investors shift savings from bank deposits into mutual funds and
money market accounts.'7 These changes are forcing banks to seek
other sources to fund their operations.
Securitization provides both an alternative method of
funding for banking institutions and a vehicle to reduce interest
rate risk.9 Through securitization activities, banks are able to sell
loans, receive cash to make new loans, and collect origination
fees.'° Once the exclusive domain of large financial institutions, a
15. MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS: THE NEXT GENERATION 2 (First Truman
Talley Books/Plume Printing 2d ed. 1998). The difference between the cost of the
funds and the interest charged on the loan are what constitute interest income to the
banks. Id. at 27. This income used to be the main source of income for banks. Id.
Interestingly, many see the future of banking resting in fee earning business, not "net
interest income" revenues from lending. Id. The CEO of North Carolina's First
Wachovia, Bud Baker, stated "As we look to the future, the traditional ways of
making money, the loans and deposits - well, that will be a much more difficult way
to make money." Id at 28.
16. Id.
17. Matthew D. Pieniazek, Community Banks Must Look For New Funding
Alternatives. AM BANKER, July 7, 2000, at 15. In fact, from 1990 to 1999, according to
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., assets in the banking system increased 41% to
$5.7 trillion, while core deposits rose only 26.6%. Id. At the end of 1999, core
deposits were just 47% of assets, against 58% at the end of 1989. Id. An even more
disturbing trend is the growth in deposits of wholesale CDs of more than $100,000,
foreign office deposits, and non deposit sources of funds like advances for Federal
Home Loan banks (which are really loans), which rose 47% in the past decade. Id.
18. Id. Pieniazek also notes that this type of pressure can force banks to take
more credit risk than may be prudent. Id.
19. Id. "Interest rate risk is the exposure ... to adverse movements in interest
rates. It results from differences in the maturity and timing of coupon adjustments of
bank assets, liabilities and off-balance-sheet instruments (repricing or maturity-
mismatch);... and from interest rate-related options embedded in bank products
(option risk)." Joint Agency Policy Statement on Interest Rate Risk No. 5000, 61 Fed.
Reg. 33,169 (June 26, 1996), at 5,421.
20. Pieniazek, supra note 17, at 15. Many community banks have been reluctant
to securitize their mortgage loans or commercial loans. Id. Some of this reluctance
may come from a fear that the purchasing financial institution may attempt to poach
their best accounts and that the smaller bank would risk losing a valuable part of
their customer base. Id. Another more practical issue is that many smaller institutions
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growing number of regional and community institutions are
beginning to use securitizations to access alternative funding
sources, manage concentrations, and meet customer loan
demand."
Asset securitization involves transferring on-balance sheet
assets that have been combined in a pool, to a third party
sometimes known as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV).' Normally,
a bank will take loans from its portfolio and combine them
together to sell.' The SPV then sells securities with varying levels
of risk and return to investors.' The security holders receive
payments on the securities that mirror payments received on the
underlying pool of loans.' Virtually any type of payment stream
that generates cash can be securitized, and there are increasingly
creative vehicles being developed daily.' For instance, bank assets
that have been securitized include credit card receivables,
automobile loans, commercial mortgages, residential first
mortgages, commercial loans, home equity loans, and student
loans.'
As deposits decline, financial institutions will more likely
do not have a large enough loan portfolio to meet the minimum requirements to
structure a securitization transaction. Id.
21. Interagency Guidance 1999, supra note 5, at 2.
22. Id. A Special Purpose Vehicle, otherwise known as an "SPV" trust, or other
legally separate entity, is formed by the originating issuer (typically the financial
institution) of the securities to receive the securities originated by the issuer in order
to separate the receivables from risks associated with the originator. Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN, J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133, 135
(1994). The originator attempts to structure the transaction so that it will meet the
requirements of a sale to remove the receivables from the originator's bankruptcy
estate. Id. at 135-136.
23. Barbara A. Rehm, Rule Would Close Capital Loophole on Securitization, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 18,2000, at 1.
24. Id.
25. Rob Garver, Proposals Clash On Recourse and Retained Interest, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 21, 2000, at 3. For more than fifty years there were two separate
intermediation channels in the financial system that were institutions and the
securities market. TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURrTIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING.
FINANCIAL ASSETS POOL, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES, § 1.1 (1991), at 5.
Recently the separation has been blurring and "securitization has emerged as a new
intermediation system that substitutes market for Institutions or combines parts of
both in new ways." Id. at 6.
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participate in the securitization market as an efficient mechanism
to mine new sources of cash.' By accessing the capital markets,
banks accomplish several important objectives: they increase
liquidity, opportunity for lending, and fee income.29 When less
sophisticated players enter the market they may not fully
appreciate nor allocate capital for the risks associated with this
activity.' Moreover, a bank's best assets may be continually
removed from the bank's balance sheet, resulting in a decrease in
the quality of the remaining assets."
Securitization activities are especially sensitive to market
conditions and, if a bank has relied on securitization to provide
liquidity, then considerable risks may exist for that bank during a
downturn.' During downturns, the capital markets may not be
able to place securitization issues with investors, thereby creating
liquidity problems for the originating institution.3 Additionally, in
the event of volatile market conditions, retained interests created
in asset securitizations and maintained as part of the institution's
capital may result in a significant devaluation of the retained
interests and an overvalued capital position.'
Both the industry and regulators regard securitization as an
important tool for banks. 5 Regulators, however, are concerned
about the increased risk exposure that securitization generates for
banks and the financial system.'
28. Pieniazek, supra note 17, at 15. Banks of all sizes are being forced to
aggressively seek out alternative sources of deposits and restructure their primary
business model. Id.
29. Id. The importance of securitization will continue to grow since liquidity
concerns appear to be a major impediment for many banking organizations. Id.
30. Interagency Guidance 1999, supra note 5, at 2.
31. Ed Blount, Rethinking the Framework, A.B.A. BANKING J. (Dec. 1999), at 68,
70.
32. Id.
33. Id. The bank would have already pooled the loans into the securitized asset
and may have tentatively targeted new loan prospects or executed loan commitments
based on the anticipated cash flow from the securitization. Id. The inability to market
the securitization would cancel the anticipated cash flow and the institution would
have an operating income shortfall. Id.
34. Interagency Guidance 1999, supra note 5, at 10. See supra note 6 (defining
retained interests).
35. Interagency Guidance 1999, supra note 5, at 2.
36. Id.
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III. REGULATORY CONCERNS
A. Capital Arbitrage
The 1988 Basel Accord succeeded in creating an
international standard for capital levels.' However, the accord did
not anticipate the increase of securitization activities by banks that
has led to a distortion of the capital ratios - and thus their
relevance.' Under the 1988 capital guidelines, banks have a great
incentive to securitize diversified high-quality loans into asset
pools with predictable loss rates. 9 The remaining on-balance sheet
portfolio may have greater risk and be less diversified than the
securitized pools, while the reported capital ratios do not indicate
the increased risk to the banking institution from the relatively
weaker remaining loans.' Additionally, the capital ratio becomes
distorted because the total risk weighted assets have decreased,
while the capital ratio increases and the bank appears to be more
37. Blount, supra note 31, at 70. The international standard of the 1988 Basel
Accord applied consistent minimum capital standards and imposed an eight percent
capital charge on the value of a bank's total risk assets, with two tiers of eligible
capital. Id.
38. Rob Garver, Arbitrage Risk Warning to Basel Panel, AM. BANKER, May 23,
2000, at 6. See also PATRICIA JACKSON, ET AL., CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND BANK
BEHAVIOUR: THE IMPACr OF THE BASLE ACCORD, (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision Working Papers, No. 1, April 1999), available at http://www.bis.
org.publ/index.htm (last modified Feb. 12, 2001) [hereinafter BASEL BEHAVIOUR
IMPAcT]. As an example, a bank may decide to originate fewer BBB-rated loans in
favor of more BB-rated loans, thereby increasing return on equity. Id. On the
surface, the bank's total risk weighted assets and regulatory capital appears
unchanged. Id. In reality, the bank is engaging in riskier transactions with higher
probability of defaults and has increased actual risk to the bank. Id. Therefore,
traditional measures that previously measured risk and triggered supervisory and
regulatory intervention do not always work. Id. Long and short-term debt have
separate rating scales, reflecting different risks assigned by a rating agency such as a
nationally recognized statistical rating organization (NRSRO) like Standard &
Poor's, Moody's, or Fitch IBCA Investors Service. Schwarcz, supra note 22, at 4-5.
Standard and Poor's highest rating on long-term debt is AAA, with ratings
descending to AA, then A, and then to BBB and below. Id. Short-term debt is rated
A-i, A-3 and below. Id. Any securities rated below BBB- are non-investment grade
securities. Id. at 5.
39. BASEL BEHAVIOUR IMPACT, supra note 38. The 1988 rule encourages banks
to identify and hold assets with low regulatory capital charges relative to the risks
they pose to improve the overall quality of assets that banks hold. Id.
40. Id.
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financially sound'
Consistent with the Basel Accord, United States banks are
required to meet two minimum capital ratios: a capital ratio and a
risk adjusted capital ratio.' The capital ratio has a target range of
41. Id. Below is a representation of a securitization without any retained risks
that shows how a bank is able to arbitrage its risk-based capital from 11% to 13.8%
and total risk-based capital from 12% to 15%. Id. at 45-46. The example assumes
proceeds from the sale of ABS securities are used to reduce the bank's outstanding
deposit liabilities. Id. at 46. This example assumes no change to reserves at either the
bank or the SPV, showing the capital arbitrage. Id. The Bank sells $40 loans to the
SPV, the SPV sells $40 ABSs to investors, then the investors pay the SPV $40 cash,
and the SPV pays the bank $40. Id.
BANK BALANCE SHEET BEFORE SECURInZATION WITH ON-BALANCE SHEET LOANS
Loans 200.00 Deposits 176.00




Loans 40.00 ABSs 40.00
BANK BALANCE SHEET AFTER SECURITIZATION
Loans 160.00 Deposits 136.00
Less Reserves (2.00) Equity 22.00
Total Assets 158.00
BEFORE SECURIMZATION AFTER BANK SECURITIZES $40 FROM
LOAN PORTFOLIO
Total Risk- weighted Assets = 200.00 Total Risk-weighted Assets = 160.00
Tier 1 Capital = 22.00 Tier 1 Capital = 22.00
Total Capital = 24.00 Total Capital = 24.00
Tier 1 Risk Based Capital Ratio = 11.0% Tier I Risk Based Capital = 13.8%
Ration
Total Risk Based Capital Ratio = 12.0% Total Risk Based Capital Ratio = 15.0%
Id. at 45-46. For further examples of other securitization structures, see Appendix 1
for the effects of removing assets from the balance sheet on the capital ratios. Id. at
45-52.
42. 12 C.F.R. § 325 app. A (2000), at 184 (Statement of Policy on Risk-Based
Capital, 2000). The capital ratio is computed by taking Tier I plus Tier II capital and
then dividing by total assets. Tier I capital consists of common stockholders equity
capital, non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock, including any related surplus. Id.
Tier II capital consists of: allowance for loan and lease losses, up to a maximum of
1.25% of risk-weighted assets, cumulative perpetual preferred stock, perpetual stock,
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between six to eight percent.43 After the initial capital ratio is
determined the regulators calculate a risk adjusted capital ratio."
Regulators require that banks maintain a risk adjusted capital ratio
in excess of eight percent.'5 Regulatory agencies utilize these
capital ratios as essential tools to evaluate the capital adequacy of
banks.46
Banks can accomplish another form of capital arbitrage
through the use of credit enhancements in securitizations."
Several types of credit enhancements commonly used are retained
interests, partial recourse, and indirect credit enhancements.'
Retained interests provide another arbitrage opportunity
for banks.49 Retained interests are a form of credit enhancement
that many securitization structures use to support a higher credit
rating on other portions of the securitization that are sold to
investors."0 The retained interest is structured to be the first loss
hybrid capital instruments, term subordinated debt and intermediate-term preferred
stock, and net unrealized holding gains on equity securities. Id. at 185.
43. Id. The 1988 Basel Committee defined two levels of capital: Tier I and Tier II
of at least 8%. Charles W. Calomiris & Robert E. Litan, Financial Regulation in a
Global Marketplace, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 293,
283-339 (2000).
44. 12 C.F.R. § 325 app. A (2000), at 186. This is accomplished by categorizing
the various assets into different risk categories, multiplying the assets by the
applicable risk weights factors, and then aggregating the total assets into one risk
adjusted number. Id. The final step requires the combination of Tier I and Tier II
capital divided by risk weighted assets. Id. Any assets deducted from capital when
computing the numerator of the risk-based capital ratio will also be excluded from
risk-weighted assets when computing the denominator of the ratio. Id. at 187. The
asset is taken and then the risk factor is multiplied by the asset and the sum of all the
assets are then considered risk adjusted assets. Id. Current risk assessments are as
follows: Cash and US government securities have a 0% risk, loans secured by
collateral from U.S. Government agencies, sponsored agencies, and guaranteed by
multilateral lending institutions or regional development banks have a 20% risk, first
mortgage loans have a 50% risk, all other loans have a 100 % risk. Id. at 190.
45. Id.
46. Calamoris & Litan, supra note 43.
47. 12 C.F.R. § 325 app. A (2000), at 186.
48. Id.; supra note 6 (defining recourse, direct credit substitute and residual
interests).
49. September 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 57996. The agencies low-level
recourse rules appear at 12 C.F.R. § 3(d) app. A (2000). Id.
50. Chairman Donna Tanoue, Recent Bank Failures and Regulatory Initiatives,
Testimony before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of
Representatives (Feb. 8, 2000) at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chaiman/
sp08Feb00.htm1 (last modified Feb. 9, 2000) [hereinafter Tanoue Feb. Testimony].
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position to absorb defaults and its valuation can be volatile
depending on the payment experience of the pool."l As part of
The Reigle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act, the agencies initiated a low-level recourse
treatment.' Many banks were being penalized and required to
hold excessive capital, at eight percent of the total underlying
transactions, although their risk exposure and credit support may
have been less than eight percent.' The rule was changed in 1995
to set regulatory capital levels at a dollar for dollar charge for the
credit risk exposure, up to a maximum of eight percent of the total
underlying transaction.' Banks holding less than an eight percent
risk exposure were allowed to apply the dollar for dollar capital
requirement to the transaction, which more accurately reflected
the risk profile of the credit enhancement.5 However, some banks
began exploiting the ambiguity of the rule and structured credit
enhancements that were in excess of eight percent of the
transaction. 6 This type of arbitrage allows banks to increase levels
of risk to the institution without corresponding capital being held
to mitigate the risk exposure.57
Securitization transactions with recourse can also lead to
arbitrage under current regulatory rules. 8 The bank can either
51. Id.
52. September 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 57,996. See also Section 350 of the
Reigle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act, codified at 12
U.S.C. § 4808.





58. March 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 12,322-23. As professionals globally
seek to continue harmonization of standards across industry lines, the Financial
Accounting Standard Board released a new FASB statement on Securitization,
FASB 140, on September 28, 2000. Press Release, The Financial Accounting
Standards Board, FASB Issues Statement on Securitizations (Sept. 28,2000) (on file
with N.C. BANKING INST.), at http:llwww.rutgers.edulAccountingraw/fasb/news
/nr92800.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2001) [hereinafter FASB Press Release Sept.
2000]. In releasing the announcement to the public, Senior Project manger Halsey
Bullen stated, "It also became clear that better disclosures were needed about
securitizations and something different was needed for collateral, and that a new
statement was needed to deal with those matters." Id. Additionally, FASB 140 seeks
to establish consistent standards to distinguish the transfer of financial assets that are
sales from transfers that are secured borrowings. Id.
[Vol. 5242
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report a securitization with recourse as a financing with recourse
or as a "true sale."59 The choice will determine if a bank must hold
regulatory capital against these essentially similar transactions.' A
financing will require the bank to hold regulatory capital against
the transaction while a "true sale" will not require any capital
allocation.6' Under the current rules, a securitization with
essentially the same "risk" could be structured so that the bank
would not have to allocate capital to the securitized assets.62
Direct credit substitutes are treated differently from
recourse obligations under the current risk-based capital
standards. Generally, an off-balance sheet direct credit
substitute, such as a standby letter of credit provided for a third-
party's assets, carries a risk weight conversion factor of 100
percent.' However, capital is only held against the face amount of
the direct credit substitute.'
Regulators have become increasingly concerned about the
risks securitization activities pose to the financial system,
especially during an economic downturn.' Despite these concerns,
banks continue to take advantage of the inconsistencies in the
current regulations and structure securitizations that require the
59. March 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 12,322. The bank can treat a
securitization as a "true sale" for accounting and regulatory purposes, even though
the bank retains risks of the underlying transaction through credit enhancements
provided to the SPV. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 12,323.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 12,319. Additionally, purchased subordinated interests receive the
same capital treatment as off-balance sheet direct credit substitutes. Id. at 12,323.
However, if the same bank had retained a subordinated interest in connection with
the transfer of its own assets and transferred them with recourse, the bank would
have to hold capital against the carrying amount of the retained subordinated interest
as well as any outstanding senior interests it supports. Id.
65. March 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 12,323. For example, a banking
organization may provide a first-loss letter of credit to an asset-backed commercial
paper conduit that lends directly to commercial customers instead of making the
loans to the commercial customer itself. Id. This results in a significantly lower capital
requirement than if the loans had originally been carried on the bank's balance sheet
and then sold. Id. The banking organization is exposed to the same risk of default,
without having to allocate capital for that risk. Id.
66. Blount, supra note 31, at 70.
243
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least amount of regulatory capital.' During an economic
downturn those institutions that have been manipulating their
capital levels and do not have adequate safety nets may become
troubled institutions.' Of greater concern is the issue that the
regulatory capital required of a bank may not be the same amount
that a prudent bank manager would choose to hold in reserve
relative to the riskiness of the bank's activities.69 These distortions
may leave little for the FDIC to salvage in the event a bank failure
occurs.
70
B. Recent Bank Failures
The number of bank failures in recent years has been low
by historical standards and consistent with expectations.
However, two bank failures have resulted in staggering losses of
approximately $900 million.' As a result, significant concerns
have been raised among regulators and Congress. 3 Two of the
failures responsible for these losses are the First National Bank of
Keystone (Keystone), in West Virginia; and Pacific Thrift and
Loan Company (PTL), in California.74 Both banks had large
concentrations of improperly valued retained interests on their
balance sheets. 5 These miscalculations created the "illusion" that
each institution had adequate capital.6
Keystone, with over a billion dollars in assets, is expected
to be the tenth-largest dollar loss in FDIC history with estimated
67. March 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 12,322-23.
68. Id.
69. Stronger Foundations, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2001.
70. Blount, supra note 31, at 70.
71. Tanoue Feb. Testimony, supra note 50, at 10. While regulators want tominimize the effect of bank failures on general economic activity, they have never
striven for zero bank failures. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1. The loss rate from a bank failure is defined as the loss to the Bank
Insurance Fund (BIF), as a percentage of the total assets of the failed bank. Id. Over
the last twenty years, the average loss rate has been twelve percent. Id.
74. Chairman Donna Tanoue, Remarks before the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors (May 12, 2000), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/chairman/
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losses between $750 million and $850 million.' The largest portion
of the loss, approximately $500 million, appears to come from
improperly recorded assets that did not belong to Keystone." The
remainder of the losses came from improperly valued retained
interests.79 Keystone originated sub-prime and high loan-to-value
loans, pooled them, and then securitized the loans.' Due to the
sub-prime quality of the loans, Keystone was required to provide
credit supports to the general investors and "retained interests" in
the securitization to absorb first losses of any defaults. "
As intended, Keystone's retained interests absorbed the
credit losses, reducing the asset value of the retained interests, as
some of the loans in the securitized pools began to default, and the
retained interests were liquidated to support the securitization.' It
is expected that between $340 million to $370 million of the
Keystone's total $380 million retained interest position will be
lost.'
The other failure that concerned regulators was PTL, which
had $118 million in assetsY PTL originated subprime mortgages
that it sold to its parent company.' PTL shared in the cash flow
from the resulting securitization with its parent company and
retained interests of approximately $50 million from these
securitizations on PTL's books.' The records indicate that the




81. Id. This is a form of credit enhancement that many securitization structures
use to support a higher credit rating on other portions of the securitization that are
sold to investors. Therefore, the retained interest is structured to be the first loss
position to absorb defaults and its valuation can be volatile depending on the
payment experience of the pool. See id.
82- Id. No corresponding entries were make to revalue the retained interests
after they were initially booked on the banks balance sheets as assets. Id. The
dimunition in value was not represented as a reduction in capital, and it appeared
that the bank had adequate resources to handle a business crisis. Id.
83. Tanoue Feb. Testimony, supra note 50, at 12.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. PTL did not receive any payments in the early years of the securitization
so it did not have sufficient operating income to pay operating expenses. Id.
Therefore, in order to generate cash flow, PTL's parent borrowed up to 75% of the
estimated value of the retained interest and passed the funds on to PTL Id. The
borrowings were to be repaid from the excess interest due to PTL and its parent. Id.
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pre-payments and losses in the underlying loans exceeded the
assumptions made in the valuations of the retained interestsY
There is little or no chance of PTL or the FDIC receiving any
payments on these retained interests.'
Retained interests are booked on a bank's balance sheet as
assets, even though they may not have any actual verifiable value,
thereby increasing aggregate capital levels." As a bank continues
to retain interests in future securitizations, the overall asset level of
the bank may appear to be increasing, but in reality the underlying
asset base may be declining in quality and actual value.' Keystone
and PTL demonstrate how booking retained interests on the
bank's balance sheet distort the meaningfulness of capital ratios.9
The retained interests were not properly valued, which gave the
illusion of well-capitalized institutions.' In reality, the banks were
on the verge of insolvency with significantly overvalued assets.'
After the failures of Keystone and PTL, regulators view
retained interests as highly volatile assets that require more
rigorous capital treatment and regulatory scrutiny. 94 Recent
examinations reveal that there are other institutions on the FDIC
problem list.' Additionally, there are a number of institutions that
are not on the problem list but that are holding more residual
interests in securitized assets than the FDIC believes is prudent.96
The regulatory agencies are thus moving to implement changes in
However, PTL stood sixth in line for any payments: first they went to scheduled
principal and interest, second to fund delinquencies and defaults, third for monthly
fees and servicing, fourth to funds required for reserve balances, fifth to payments on
the borrowings of PTL against the advance on the retained interests loan, and finally,
if any payments remained, to PTL. Id. at 13. The FDIC believes that the $50 million
retained interests shown as assets on the PTL banking books are probably worthless
and will result in a zero recovery at a total loss rate of approximately 40%. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Tanoue May Remarks, supra note 74, at 1.
90. Id. Because capital is one of the main levers for controlling growth,
unrealistic assumptions can lead to catastrophic losses and insolvency. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1.
93. Id.
94. Id at 3.
95. Tanoue May Remarks, supra note 74, at 3.
96. Id.
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the way residual interests are valuedY
IV. REGULATORY RESPONSE
During the previous year, the OCC, FDIC, FRB, and OTS
have jointly taken three separate actions to respond to the
changing complexity of banking.' The agencies first issued a
guidance letter on asset securitization activities in December of
1999.' Then in March 2000, the agencies proposed new
regulations for the treatment of recourse and direct-credit
substitutes.1" In September 2000, the agencies proposed new
capital rules for the treatment of residual interests."'
The December 1999 Interagency Guidance on Asset
Securitization set forth the agencies' concerns about
securitizations.1" The fourteen-page document stated: "the
Agencies are jointly issuing this statement to remind financial
institution managers and examiners of the importance of
fundamental risk management practices governing asset
securitization activities."1" Examinations suggest that relatively
new users of securitizations do not adequately appreciate the
complexities and risk that securitizations pose to banks."° Two
specific areas that the letter discussed are: "(1) the failure to
recognize and hold sufficient capital against explicit and implicit
recourse obligations that frequently accompany securitizations,
[and] (2) the excessive or inadequately supported valuation of
'retained interests."' 10 5
97. Id. The trend is toward restricting banks from holding excessive
concentrations of residual assets. Id.
98. See Interagency Guidance 1999, supra note 5, at 1.
99. Id.
100. March 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 12,320.
101. Press Release, FRB, FDIC, OCC, and OTS, Agencies Propose Revision of
Capital Rules for the Treatment of Residual Interests (Sept. 27, 2000), available at
http:lwww.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/presslboardacts/2000/20000927/default.htm.
(last visited Feb. 27, 2001).
102. Id.
103. Interagency Guidance 1999, supra note 5, at 1.
104. Id. at 2.
105. Id. at 1. Retained interests are those rights to cash flows and other assets not
used to extinguish bondholder obligations and pay credit losses, servicing fees and
other trust fees, and include over-collateralization, spread accounts, cash collateral
247
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The March 2000 rules, which closely followed the
December letter, proposed amending the risk-based capital
standards for certain recourse obligations, direct credit substitutes,
and securitized transactions." The proposal involves detailed
changes to various aspects of the securitization process and
introduces the use of ratings agencies as a way to objectively
measure credit risk.y0
The main components of the March 2000 proposed
regulation would:
1. Assign a risk-based charge to positions in
securitized transactions according to the relative
credit risk of those positions as measured by credit
ratings received from nationally recognized rating
agencies."°
accounts, and interest only strips (10 strips). Id.
106. March 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 12,319. Mr. Hahn said his sense is that
some regulation will result from this proposal although the final form has not yet
been determined. Telephone Interview with Robert Hahn, attorney with Kilpatrick
Stockton, LLP (Oct. 13, 2000). The current proposal is the culmination of years of
effort by the agencies to develop a method to establish appropriate levels of capital
for banking organizations relative to their risk exposure from recourse and direct
credit substitutes. Id.
107. March 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 12,319. The first regulatory effort to
address the capital requirements for recourse and direct credit substitutes occurred in
June 1990. See 55 Fed. Reg. 26,766 (June 29, 1990). In 1994, another proposal was
floated. 59 Fed. Reg. 27,116 (May 25, 1994). Again, on November 5, 1997, the
agencies published another proposed Risk-Based Capital Standards: Recourse and
Direct Credit Substitutes, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,944 (Nov. 5, 1997). The capital reduction
for low level recourse transactions and defining "recourse," and "direct credit
substitute" was eventually implemented by the OCC, The Board and the FDIC in
1995. Id. Part of the incentive to pass the section of the rule making notice was the
requirement for the agencies to satisfy the requirements of section 350 of the Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act, Public Law 103-325,
§ 350, 108 Stat. 2160, 2242 (CDRI Act). Id. This proposed regulation was the 1997
Proposed 62 Fed. Reg. 59,944. Id.
108. March 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 12,323. The ratings can be done by any
"nationally recognized statistical rating organization," this means any entity such as
Standard & Poor's, Moody's or Fitch. Id. at n.13. See SEC Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(E),
(F) and (H), 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(E), (F), and (H). The table below shows
the resulting capital requirements for recourse obligations, direct credit substitutes,
and senior and subordinated securities in asset securitizations. Id. See also Basel
1999 Proposal, supra note 3.
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2. Treat recourse obligations and direct credit
substitutes more consistently under risk-based
capital rules."°
3. Define "recourse""11 and revise the definition of
"direct credit substitute."'1
4. Permit the limited use of an institution's internal
risk-rating system and other alternative approaches
in determining the risk-based capital requirement
for unrated direct credit substitutes associated with
asset-backed commercial programs and other
structured finance programs."2
5. Require banking organizations to hold additional
risk-based capital against risks presented by the
249
Rating Category Examples Risk Rate
Highest or second highest investment grade AAA or AA 20%
Third highest investment grade A 50%
Lowest investment grade BBB 100%
One category below investment grade BB 200%
More than one category below investment B or unrated "Gross-up"
grade, or unrated treatment*
* Gross-up treatment takes the position and combines it with all more senior
positions in the transactions, resulting in a risk-weighting based on the nature of the
underlying assets. Id.
109. March 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 12,323.
110. Id.
111. March 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 12,323; supra note 6 (defining direct
credit substitutes).
112. March 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 12,323. Banking organizations with a
qualifying internal risk rating system can use that system to their un-rated direct
credit substitutes in asset-backed commercial paper programs. Id. Internal risk
ratings can be used for a risk weight of 100% or 200% under the ratings-based
approach, but not for a risk weight of less than 100%. Id. This will allow institutions
to avoid costly gross-up treatment that would apply to an un-rated position. Id. The
agencies feel that an internal risk rating approach may be less costly than a ratings-
based approach that relies exclusively on ratings from external rating agencies for the
risk-weighting of these positions. Id.
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
early amortization of revolving asset
securitizations.1 3
On September 28, 2000, the agencies jointly proposed to
amend the capital rules for the treatment of residual interests."'
This was done despite the fact that the regulations proposed in
March 2000 regarding the treatment of certain recourse
obligations, direct credit substitutes, and securitized transactions
were still being debated."5
The new rule proposes to align risk exposure with
regulatory capital requirements, encourage conservative valuation
methods, and restrict the concentration of these residual interests
on a bank's balance sheet."' Residual interests in the September
proposal are defined as those on-balance sheet assets that
represent interests (including beneficial interests) in the
transferred financial assets retained by the bank (or transferor)
113. Id. at 12,323. Early amortization features are structured into some
securitization transactions in order to ensure that investors will be repaid before
being subject to the risk of credit loss. Id. There are three distinct risks to the bank,
first the seller's interest is subordinated to the interest of the investors by the
payment allocation applied during early amortization. Id. The Investors will get paid
first, so the bank's residual interest will absorb a disproportionate share of credit
losses. Id. Second the early amortization can create liquidity problems for the seller.
Id. Third the first two risks can create an incentive to provide implicit recourse to
prevent early amortization. Id. In order to account for these risks the agencies
would require that the securitized off-balance sheet assets to receive a 20% risk
category, effectively applying a 1.6% risk-based capital charge to these off balance
sheet assets. Id.
114. September 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 57,993. FASB has initiated Rule
140 which requires two sets of disclosures where an issuer retains an interest in a
securitization and records the transaction as a sale and the assumptions used in
valuing the residuals, such as the discount rates, prepayment rates and anticipated
losses. Brian Collins, Regulatory Watch: FASB Issues New Version of Rules for
Accounting of Servicing Transfers, MORTGAGE SERVICING NEwS, Nov. 2000, at 22.
The banks will also have to report cash flows between the retained interests and the
mortgage trusts, if key assumptions have changed, and finally show how the retained
assets would perform under stress tests. Id 'Demands on FASB to develop better
disclosure methods for residuals started in 1998 after several publicly traded
subprime lender that abused gain on sale accounting failed." Id. The Bond Market
Association "complained that FASB is penalizing the entire industry for the actions
of a small number of subprime lenders." Despite this opposition the new rules went
into effect December 15,2000. Id.
115. March 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 12,323.
116. September 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 57,993.
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after a securitization."7  The residual interests subject to this
proposal are structured to absorb more than a pro rata share of
credit loss related to the securitized or sold assets by utilizing
subordination provisions or other credit enhancement
techniques."8 Residual interests provide a unique challenge to
valuation because of their illiquid and volatile nature."9
There are three components to the new rule.' The first
changes the leverage and risk-based capital requirements by
requiring that financial institutions set aside dollar-for-dollar risk-
based capital equal to the amount of the residual interest retained
on a bank's balance sheet." For example, suppose an institution
participates in a securitized transaction for a total of $100 million
and records a residual interest of $5 million." Under the "low-
level recourse rule," the institution would be required to hold
either a dollar-for dollar capital charge to a maximum level of 8%;
therefore, the bank would be required to hold $5 million of
regulatory capital for the transaction.' Now assume that the bank
has instead retained $15 million in retained residual interests on
the same $100 million transaction.24 Under the current rules the
bank is only required to hold regulatory capital up to 8%, which
117. Id. Examples of residual interests include, but are not limited to, interest only
strips receivable (I/O strips), spread accounts, cash collateral accounts, retained
subordinated interests, and other similar forms of on-balance sheet assets that
function as a credit enhancement. Id. "Residual interests as defined in the proposed
rule, do not include interests purchased from a third party." Id.
118. Id. at 57,997. The interests covered by this rule are generally retained by the
selling institution because they are usually illiquid and volatile. Id. The rule extends
to all residual interests, as defined in the banking book and the trading book, that are
subject to market risk rules. Id. This rule only applies to residual interests that have
been retained by the institution and does not apply to residual interests that a
banking organization purchases from another party. Id. However, the agencies are
considering including some purchased interests within the scope of the proposed rule
and are requesting comment. Id.
119. Id. at 57,993. Since residual interests generally do not have an active market,
they do not have an easily ascertainable market value. Therefore, the financial
institution must estimate the value of the residual interest. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. The proposal also has some tax treatment considerations and seeks
industry input on how to determine the level of complexity that should be applied to
determine a net-of-tax treatment for residual interests. Id.
122. Id. at 57,993.
123. September 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 57,996.
124. Id.
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would be $8 million, even though the bank is exposed to a credit
risk of $15 million.1" If the bank has to write down the asset from
$15 million to $5 million, the $8 million of required capital would
be insufficient to absorb the full loss of $10 million. 6 Removal of
the current "cap" of 8% will ensure that all residual interests are
subject to the "dollar-for-dollar" standard and that the capital held
represents the organization's total exposure for loss."
The second part of the new rules proposes to restrict
concentrations of residual interests held on an institution's balance
sheet to no more than 25% of Tier I capital." This limit should
prevent banks from holding excessive concentrations of residual
interests. 1 The September 2000 proposal could significantly
impact the capital treatment of many institutions participating in
securitizations and determine the feasibility of certain types of
transactions pending the implementation of this rule.'" The
agencies believe that this proposal should help remedy some of the
major regulatory concerns about the illiquid and volatile nature of
residual interests.
The third component of the rule concerns regulatory





129. September 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 57,996. The rule is intended with
the two prong approach to ensure that residual interests are supported by "dollar-for-
dollar" capital and that financial institutions will avoid the concentration of residual
interests on the balance sheet of over 25% of capital because of the harsh regulatory
treatment relative to capital. Id.
130. Scott Barancik, Agencies Say Small Banks' Securitizing Getting Risky, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 14, 1999, at 1. In fact, if bank examiners are successful in forcing
banks to lower their residuals' value there could be some capital problems. Id.
Recently, the OCC deemed Goleta (Cal.) National Bank "significantly
undercapitalized" because of residual values and ordered the institution to raise
additional capital. Id. These types of problems may not be isolated. Id. According
to the FDIC, eleven banks and thrifts nationwide have residuals that total at least
25% of equity capital and two of the four institutions whose residuals equaled 100%
or more of the equity capital at midyear later failed: First National and Pacific Thrift.
Id. Mark S. Shmidt, Associate Director of Bank Supervisory Policy at the FDIC said
the "poster children for these problems are First National Bank of Keystone, which
failed Sept. 1, and Pacific Thrift and Loan, a Woodside, California based institution
that closed Nov. 19." Id. at 1.
131. September 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 57,998.
132. Id.
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capital standards to provide them with extensive authority and
flexibility to administer the capital standard because of the rapidly
changing innovations in banking.133 The proposal would give the
Agencies' authority, on a case-by-case basis, to determine the
appropriate risk-weight of assets created during innovative
securitizations, and assign corresponding capital requirements."
They intend to retain sufficient discretion to ensure that
institutions which develop novel financial structures will be treated
appropriately under the risk-based capital standards. 5
The agencies recognize the controversies that surround the
March proposal and the potential political fall-out of preemptively
initiating regulations on recourse and direct credit substitutes
while the Basel Committee works towards a final proposal.'36 It is
likely that there may be some delay in implementing the March
proposal.' 7 However, the perceived danger to the financial system
in light of the recent bank failures and the excessive
concentrations of retained interests on bank balance sheets has
fast-tracked the September proposal, despite considerable
opposition." This momentum may help the agencies move
forward with the September regulatory initiative independent of
the March proposal.'
V. ANALYSIS
The U.S. bank regulatory agencies are committed to
protecting the banking industry from the perceived risk to the
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. The agencies acknowledge that this new proposal is interrelated to the
March 2000 Securitization proposals and that there are some differences in treatment
under the two proposals. Id. The proposal asks for comments on how the capital
treatment for residual interests under this proposal should be reconciled with the
capital treatment recommended in the March securitization proposal. Id. at 57,999.
Final Comments on this rule are due by December 27, 2000. Id. However, the
comment period on the March proposal ended in June of 2000, and the proposal is
silent as to the status of the March proposal. March 2000 Proposal, supra note 6.
136. Telephone Interview with Tom Boemio, Supervisory Financial Analyst,
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industry from banks that participate in securitization activities.140
U.S. officials are not alone in this effort as industry leaders from
around the world are working on global solutions to a myriad of
problems to the evolving banking industry. Not surprisingly, the
March 2000 proposal by U.S. agencies incorporates many of the
proposals made in the revised Basel proposal of 1999.141
Many in the community are strongly urging the agencies to
delay implementing a final rule regarding capital for credit
enhancements until Basel can ratify the new accord.42 The
political fall-out from the international financial community could
be great if the U.S. implements the March proposal.43 The U.S.,
as a major participant and architect of the Basel process, could
undermine the significance of the accord, minimize the ultimate
legitimacy of the final accord and marginalize the concerns,
interests and comments of the other participants.1" Those who
already question the "influence" of the U.S. over the Basel process
would view any move on the part of the U.S. as a preemptive
maneuver to effectively make those portions of the continuing
dialogue and input from other countries meaningless. 45
While most generally agree with the agencies' attempt to
equalize the treatment of recourse interests, retained interests and
credit enhancements, the timing of the implementation and
structure of the regulations is of significant concern."' The
implementation of this policy should be considered in the context
140. Rob Garver, Proposals Clash On Recourse and Retained Interest, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 21,2000, at 3.
141. Robert Morris Associates, Response to U.S. Agencies' Joint Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking: Risk-Based Capital Standards; Recourse and Direct Credit
Substitutes, June 7, 2000, at 20.
142. Id. The revised Basel proposal was released on January 16,2001, consisting of
over five hundred pages. THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE
NEw BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD (Consultative Paper, Jan. 2001), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/index.htm (last modified Feb. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Basel 2001].
The new report requests comments until May 31, 2001 with anticipated
implementation sometime in 2004. Id.
143. Boemio Interview, supra note 136.
144. Id. Once the U.S. committed itself to pursuing the adoption of a revision to
the Basel Accord of 1989 it should not preemptively act to diminish the effectiveness
of that effort.
145. Id.
146. Basel 2001, supra note 142.
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of the necessity for banks to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage
and the current regulatory capital requirements for on and off
balance-sheet items.147
The unilateral view of regulators that all regulatory capital
arbitrage is bad should be tempered, especially in light of
comments by Chairman Greenspan, who has indicated that such
arbitrage "acts as a safety-valve."1  The regulators' view is
especially unfortunate in cases where arbitrary on-balance-sheet
regulatory capital requirements might preclude the bank from
engaging in a low-risk, socially desirable lending activity (because
returns to such regulatory capital would be too low).149 This is a
compelling argument for social good; however, most
securitizations are not done to further public policy but are
intended as vehicles to maximize profits in the institution. Perhaps
more appropriate is the argument that the current capital charges
are significantly in excess of best-practice estimates for
appropriate economic capital; therefore, banks must participate in
securitizations when "best-practice internal procedures for
allocating capital" are not applied.15"
Another concern is that regulators are setting capital
requirements, wherever possible, based on a rigorous standard for
bank soundness."' Under modern economic capital measurement
techniques, this type of rule should provide regulators with specific
guidance as to appropriate minimum capital levels."' However,
instead of evaluating a portfolio, the agencies appear to be content
with setting capital requirements in the ordinal fashion, with each
proposal based on capital being either higher or lower that the
standard eight percent requirement found in the Accord.'
147. Id.
148. Id. at 3-4.
149. Id. Banks that engage in sub-prime loans to segments of the market that
would otherwise be unable to access financing may be restricted from continuining to
provide loans if they are unable to securitize and reduce the level of "higher risk
loans" from their balance sheets. This is a sensitive subject as there is significant
movement to increase the participation of historically marginal homebuyers, yet
these regulations may be at cross purposes with that policy.
150. Id. at 4.
151. Basel 2001, supra note 142, at 4.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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The March proposal builds upon the earlier Basel Accord
and continues a simplistic approach for setting capital
requirements for credit risk." This approach ignores the fact that
the risks of individual assets should be correlated with other assets
in a firm's portfolio.5 s As an example, one bank has all its loans
committed to highly-rated firms, but they are all in the oil and gas
industry, while the other bank has a loan portfolio of highly-rated
firms diversified across industries; yet the current proposal that
only looks to individual borrowers would impose the same
requirements on both institutions. 6 This type of approach holds
little promise of providing an accurate measure of an institution's
overall risk and does not solve the problem of continued capital
arbitrage."
The proposal retains the "risk bucket" approach for
establishing capital requirements.5 This approach ignores modern
portfolio management techniques, which dictate that the
determination of the true riskiness of a portfolio must be based on
an over-all view of the portfolio of assets, liabilities, and off-
balance-sheet risks, rather than an isolated view of individual
assets.159
A recent study of the Basel Accord confirms that the
current standards have failed to limit bank default risk or to
provide an accurate assessment of bank asset risk. Banks were
apparently encouraged to assume greater leverage once the
standards were in place."w This begs the question, will layering
more complex capital levels fix what may be an inherently faulty
assumption that bank solvency is best protected through the
154. Howell E. Jackson, The Role of Rating Agencies in the Establishment of
Capital Standards for Financial Institutions in A Global Economy, CAMBRIDGE




158. Calomiris & Litan, supra note 43, at 311. The new proposal in setting relative
rankings of risk categories may introduce more arbitrariness into the process and
may be no better at allocating capital for the risk to the banking institution. Id. This
is not just a technical objection because by failing to measure overall portfolio risks,
the proposal does not encourage banks to target the appropriate amount of capital to
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imposition of capital levels? 6'
Giorgio Szego, professor of mathematical finance at the
University of Rome, proposes that the current minimum capital
ratio is not risk adjusted but liquidity adjusted and that the main
cause of bank failures is loan concentration, not inadequate capital
levels as assigned by the Basel committee. 62 "In an interview
given in 1996, Mr. Peter Cooke, the historical chairman of the
Basel committee, stated, 'Capital was a singularly convenient and
useful element of banking business for regulators to seize upon
and legislate over.""'63
Both proposals are likely to draw intensive debate but
regulators want to implement the September proposal, because
they believe that the retained interests from securitizations are the
most potentially dangerous forms of recourse arrangements that a
bank can hold after a securitization."
The bankers are openly critical of the September 2000
proposed rule, complaining that it is too broad, contradicts other
proposals, and is punitive and unnecessary." Bankers feel that the
regulators are responding to isolated problems with residuals and
overreacting with inconsistent rules." A joint letter from several
large banks states that the supervisory concerns that led to the
September proposal should not invalidate the years of work and
study reflected in both the March 2000 proposal, and the Basel
proposal.67 A main complaint is the lack of differentiation among
retained interests based on credit quality and that the proposal
attempts to force a one-size fits all approach as a solution to the
residual interest problem."
161. See generally id
162. SZEGO, supra note 9, at 152.
163. Id. at 153.
164. Garver, supra note 25, at 3.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. For example, the March proposal would reduce capital requirements for a
retained subordinated interest that receives a high rating from a rating agency. Id.
The residual proposal does not recognize the difference of potential credit quality of
interests and assigns the same capital regardless of the rating of the interest. Id. So
while the March proposal would assign a different capital level the September
proposal would not, therefore leading to conflicting treatments under the regulatory
scheme. Id.
168. Id.
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Opponents to the proposal contend that all residuals are
not the same, nor are they valued the same way.69 While some
residuals are susceptible to overly aggressive valuations, others
have definite values.' For example, some residuals with definite
values that are not subject to change in value based upon
assumptions are cash assets from spread accounts, subordinated
securities, and retained portions of sold assets; however, these
assets will be treated exactly the same way as highly volatile
retained interests.'"
Bankers also argue that since the problem is limited to a
small number of banks, the agencies should, within their
discretion, look at those individual banks." In fact James E.
O'Connor, tax and accounting council for America's Community
bankers wrote:
Given the supervisory option of imposing individual
minimum capital requirements on any entity where
there is an undue exposure not captured by the
overall risk-based approach, it is not clear why this
individualized approach could not be substituted for
the entire complex apparatus of the proposed rule.'
Despite industry objections, the agencies appear to be
determined to initiate some form of regulatory action concerning
retained interests.Y However, the agencies continue to point to
the recent failure of several banking organizations that had
residual interests exceeding the recommended concentrations of
169. Id. Several of the larger banks have invested significant time and money in
developing systems that fluctuate in value as requested by the December Guidance
letter. Id.
170. Garver, supra note 25, at 3.
171. Id. Mr. Wright, Vice Chairman and Chief Finance Officer of MBNA, writes
that the proposal would "unfairly penalize banks, such as MBNA, that have
developed and implemented a prudent securitization program." Id. He further went
on to say that "MBNA had securitized more than eighty eight billion dollars of credit
card and other loans since 1986 and had never overvalued any residuals." Id.
172. Id. Those banks that have implemented prudent investment and management
practices to properly manage the risks of these types of securitizations should be
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the proposed September 2000 rule. 5 The agencies are especially
concerned with smaller banks that are securitizing and holding
residuals on their balance sheet.176 They feel that many institutions
lack the market expertise and internal management controls
necessary to fully appreciate and evaluate the impact of the
activities on the soundness of the institution."i Regulators are
responsible for maintaining the safety and soundness of our
financial institutions and they believe it is their responsibility to act
when significant risks develop in the industry. 78
VI. CONCLUSION
Any financial institution can absorb some losses in retained
interests and still maintain its solvency. More problematic is a
bank that has not properly allocated capital for its risks and
continues to maintain high concentrations of retained interests
relative to the rest of its assets. An institution like this will be at a
greater risk to fail, as evidenced by the experience at both
Keystone and PTL.
Banks meanwhile continue to structure securitizations so
that they can exploit the anomaly of the regulation. 9 In doing so,
they potentially put the soundness of their financial institution at
risk by excessively leveraging the institution."* While during good
economic times this may seem to be a sustainable activity, in the
175. Id.
176. Garver, supra note 25, at 3. The problem with many of these banks is that
they are at a disadvantage because they do not have the diversification of assets and
are more likely to have large concentrations of these residuals combined with the
lack of efficient risk management policies. Id. This creates a problem that a bank
doesn't understand the value of the residuals, may over value them and then when a
credit problem occurs there is insufficient capital to absorb the credit loss and the
bank faces insolvency. Id.
177. Interagency Guidance 1999, supra note 5, at 1.
178. Boemio Interview, supra note 136. A concern of regulators is the similarities
they see between the balance sheets of banks holding retained interest and the
failures of New England thrifts in the late 1980s. Id. The structures and
concentrations of "sub-prime loans" that created phantom income and asset values
during the eighties appears similar to the effect that residual interests have on bank
balance sheets today. Id.
179. See generally Interagency Guidance 1999, supra note 5.
180. See, Rob Blackwell, Bankers Call New Residuals Proposal Too Broad,
Punitive, AM. BANKER, Jan. 3, 2001, at 5.
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event of an economic downturn with increased loan losses and
decreased business activity, it may well make the difference
between an institution that can survive the losses and one that
becomes insolvent.
When a bank holds a large portion of retained interests as
assets on its balance sheet as traditional capital reserves, the
underlying risk and capital adequacy assumptions become invalid.
This is why the losses experienced at Keystone and PTL exceeded
historical norms and the BIiF was faced with bailout costs far in
excess of the traditional bank failure.
The September 2000 proposal intends to discourage this
type of regulatory capital arbitrage and the concentration of
retained interests as a bank asset. 8' Perhaps the framework of a
dollar for dollar set aside and the 25% concentration limit appears
excessive." There may be room for discussion and some
refinement of the structure of the regulation.in What appears to
be clear, however, is that the agencies perceive this issue to be one
that requires immediate and decisive intervention to prevent more
bank failures similar to Keystone and PTL.'"
The implementation of any proposal requires a delicate
balancing act between overly burdensome regulation and the need
to protect the safety and soundness of our banking system verses
the innovations of the marketplace and the necessity of banks to
effectively compete and maintain profitability.85 Alan Greenspan
spoke about the regulatory and supervisory challenges facing the
industry as we enter the new century at a recent speech to the
ABA convention in September of 2000." During the speech he
stated:
181. Boemio Interview, supra note 138.
182. Blackwell, supra note 180, at 5.
183. Boemio Interview, supra note 138.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Remarks by Chairman Allan Greenspan on Banking Supervision Before the
American Bankers Association, Washington, D.C. Sept. 18,2000, at http:www.federal
reserve.govlboarddocs/speeches/2000/20000918.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2001)
[hereinafter Greenspan Sept. 2000 Speech].
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[r]apidly changing technology has begun to render
obsolete much of the bank examination regime...
have required federal and state examiners to focus
supervision more on risk-management than on
actual portfolios ... today's products and rapidly
changing structures of finance mean that supervisors
are backing off from detail-oriented supervision, ...
toward a system in which we judge how well your
internal risk models are functioning and whether the
risk... is being appropriately managed and offset
with capital.., how to blend functional regulation
and umbrella supervision."n
As market forces continue to shape the dialogue between
regulators and banks, both will be required to challenge the
existing system to create a banking industry able to compete in the
new economy."
The international initiative headed by the Basel Committee
has undertaken the massive task of establishing global standard for
banking supervision and regulatory oversight with anticipated
implementation of a new Accord sometime in 2004.' The initial
comment period generated more than 200 responses.1" After
additional discussions with the industry and reviewing the
comments the Committee released a more concrete proposal in
January 2001, seeking final comments before May 31, 2001 and
anticipating that the final form of the proposal will be available
toward the end of 2001.191
As the Basel proposal moves forward toward its final form,
the innovations in the marketplace will continue and the standards
of today may not meet the requirements of tomorrow's financial
marketplace." Attempts to refine the standards inevitably will lag
fast-paced market developments; therefore, flexible and
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Basel 2001, supra note 142.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Calomiris & Litan, supra note 43, at 313.
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responsive standards must be an important component of any
Accord.1"
The proposed U.S. rules are presently in limbo, the
comment period has ended for the March 2000 proposal and the
comment period closed in December for the proposed September
2000 rule.194 It appears that the prevailing sentiment may well be
to wait until the Basel Committee finalizes the Capital Adequacy
Proposal before implementing the March rule."5
As we look at these initiatives, we have many unanswered
questions. It remains to be seen what ultimate form these
regulatory initiatives will take. It is unquestioned that supervisors
across the globe are committed to initiating new standards to deal
with the vastly different banking and financial markets that exist
today."6
The markets want a regulatory scheme reflective of the
realities of the marketplace that will allow growth and innovation.
Of significant concern to the banking industry, however, is the
capital treatment of securitizations in the various proposals. Over
the past decade securitization has contributed to the liquidity of
the capital markets and to our economic growth. "The ability of
banks to sell pools of loans into the capital markets enhances the
efficiency of the lending process."" Overly burdensome
regulatory requirements could negatively impact this important
tool and reduce the liquidity of the marketplace and profitability
of well-managed banks.
We do not know if the new regulations, will work as
intended. However, it is clear that the existing regulations and
rules are unable to accurately access the health of our financial
institutions today. Change is a constant and the ability of our
193. Id.
194. Boemio Interview, supra note 138.
195. Id.
196. Basel 2001, supra note 142.
197. Robert J. Grossman, Securitize or Sink, J. LENDING & CREDIT RISK MGMT.,
Apr. 2000, available at http://www.rmahq.orglJoinlAprilJournall0400_O9.html (last
visited Feb. 27, 2001). Grossman makes the assertion that the old business model of
originating loans and holding them on the bank's books is out of date. Id. Banks that
securitize will be more profitable and be able to pick up market share from banks
that choose not to securitize. Id.
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supervisory agencies to adapt to the change is of critical
importance to the future of banking. The challenge for our
banking industry is the implementation of flexible and yet effective
regulatory initiative. To quote Chairman Greenspan:
In 1875, the American economy and its banking
industry stood on the threshold of a profound
technological revolution that would challenge and
enrich our nation in unimaginable ways. I believe
that in the year 2000 we may well be on the cusp of
a similar revolution. The banker of the nineteenth
century met their many challenges and kept the
banking industry a vibrant and critical part of the
U.S. economy. I am confident that the bankers of
the twenty-first century, though no less challenged,
will prove no less capable.9'
CYNTHIA C. MABEL
198. Greenspan Sept. 2000 Speech, supra note 186, at 5.
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